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ServiceInnovationLab/RapuTure

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Showing 208 of 212 total issues

ReDoS based DoS vulnerability in Action Dispatch
Open

    actionpack (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2023-22795

URL: https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v7.0.4.1

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.8.15, ~> 5.2.8, >= 6.1.7.1, ~> 6.1.7, >= 7.0.4.1

Possible RCE escalation bug with Serialized Columns in Active Record
Open

    activerecord (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2022-32224

Criticality: Critical

URL: https://groups.google.com/g/rubyonrails-security/c/MmFO3LYQE8U

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.8.1, ~> 5.2.8, >= 6.0.5.1, ~> 6.0.5, >= 6.1.6.1, ~> 6.1.6, >= 7.0.3.1

Possible XSS Vulnerability in Action Pack
Open

    actionpack (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2022-22577

Criticality: Medium

URL: https://groups.google.com/g/ruby-security-ann/c/NuFRKaN5swI

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.7.1, ~> 5.2.7, >= 6.0.4.8, ~> 6.0.4, >= 6.1.5.1, ~> 6.1.5, >= 7.0.2.4

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') in puma
Open

    puma (4.3.5)
Severity: Info
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2021-41136

Criticality: Low

URL: https://github.com/puma/puma/security/advisories/GHSA-48w2-rm65-62xx

Solution: upgrade to ~> 4.3.9, >= 5.5.1

Keepalive Connections Causing Denial Of Service in puma
Open

    puma (4.3.5)
Severity: Critical
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2021-29509

Criticality: High

URL: https://github.com/puma/puma/security/advisories/GHSA-q28m-8xjw-8vr5

Solution: upgrade to ~> 4.3.8, >= 5.3.1

ReDoS based DoS vulnerability in Active Support’s underscore
Open

    activesupport (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2023-22796

URL: https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v7.0.4.1

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.8.15, ~> 5.2.8, >= 6.1.7.1, ~> 6.1.7, >= 7.0.4.1

Denial of service via header parsing in Rack
Open

    rack (2.2.3)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2022-44570

URL: https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v3.0.4.1

Solution: upgrade to >= 2.0.9.2, ~> 2.0.9, >= 2.1.4.2, ~> 2.1.4, >= 2.2.6.2, ~> 2.2.6, >= 3.0.4.1

Injection/XSS in Redcarpet
Open

    redcarpet (3.5.0)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2020-26298

Criticality: Medium

URL: https://github.com/vmg/redcarpet/commit/a699c82292b17c8e6a62e1914d5eccc252272793

Solution: upgrade to >= 3.5.1

Potentially unintended unmarshalling of user-provided objects in MemCacheStore and RedisCacheStore
Open

    activesupport (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2020-8165

Criticality: Critical

URL: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/bv6fW4S0Y1c

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.4.3, ~> 5.2.4, >= 6.0.3.1

Specify a :dependent option.
Open

  has_many :variables
Severity: Minor
Found in app/models/entity.rb by rubocop

This cop looks for has_many or has_one associations that don't specify a :dependent option. It doesn't register an offense if :through option was specified.

Example:

# bad
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :comments
  has_one :avatar
end

# good
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :comments, dependent: :restrict_with_exception
  has_one :avatar, dependent: :destroy
  has_many :patients, through: :appointments
end

Useless assignment to variable - extensions.
Open

    markdown = Redcarpet::Markdown.new(Redcarpet::Render::HTML, extensions = {})
Severity: Minor
Found in app/helpers/application_helper.rb by rubocop

This cop checks for every useless assignment to local variable in every scope. The basic idea for this cop was from the warning of ruby -cw:

assigned but unused variable - foo

Currently this cop has advanced logic that detects unreferenced reassignments and properly handles varied cases such as branch, loop, rescue, ensure, etc.

Example:

# bad

def some_method
  some_var = 1
  do_something
end

Example:

# good

def some_method
  some_var = 1
  do_something(some_var)
end

Possible Strong Parameters Bypass in ActionPack
Open

    actionpack (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Critical
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2020-8164

Criticality: High

URL: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/f6ioe4sdpbY

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.4.3, ~> 5.2.4, >= 6.0.3.1

CSRF Vulnerability in rails-ujs
Open

    actionview (5.2.4.2)
Severity: Minor
Found in Gemfile.lock by bundler-audit

Advisory: CVE-2020-8167

Criticality: Medium

URL: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rubyonrails-security/x9DixQDG9a0

Solution: upgrade to >= 5.2.4.3, ~> 5.2.4, >= 6.0.3.1

Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk.
Open

    markdown.render(content).html_safe
Severity: Minor
Found in app/helpers/application_helper.rb by rubocop

This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.

Example:

user_content = "hi"

# bad
"
#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
hi
"

# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
<b>hi</b>
"

# bad
out = ""
out << "
  • #{user_content}
    • "
out << "
  • #{user_content}
    • "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
  • hi
    • 

  • hi
    • "

# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "
  • <b>hi</b>
    • 

  • <b>hi</b>
    • "

# bad
out = "
    trusted content
    ".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
    trusted_content
    
hi"

# good
out = "
    trusted content
    ".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "
    trusted_content
    <b>hi</b>"

# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>

# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"

# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "<b>hi</b> <span>&lt;b&gt;hi&lt;/b&gt;</span>"

    Specify a :dependent option.
    Open

      has_many :roles
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/models/entity.rb by rubocop

    This cop looks for has_many or has_one associations that don't specify a :dependent option. It doesn't register an offense if :through option was specified.

    Example:

    # bad
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :comments
  has_one :avatar
end

# good
class User < ActiveRecord::Base
  has_many :comments, dependent: :restrict_with_exception
  has_one :avatar, dependent: :destroy
  has_many :patients, through: :appointments
end

    Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk.
    Open

        formula.html_safe
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/helpers/variables_helper.rb by rubocop

    This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.

    Example:

    user_content = "hi"

# bad
"
    #{user_content}
    ".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
    hi
    "

# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
    <b>hi</b>
    "

# bad
out = ""
out << "
  • #{user_content}
    • "
out << "
  • #{user_content}
    • "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
  • hi
    • 

  • hi
    • "

# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "
  • <b>hi</b>
    • 

  • <b>hi</b>
    • "

# bad
out = "
    trusted content
    ".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "
    trusted_content
    
hi"

# good
out = "
    trusted content
    ".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "
    trusted_content
    <b>hi</b>"

# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>

# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"

# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
#    "<b>hi</b> <span>&lt;b&gt;hi&lt;/b&gt;</span>"

    Trailing whitespace detected.
    Open

                      raise format('invalid direction %<direction>',
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/models/scenario.rb by rubocop

    0.125 should be written without a leading zero as .125
    Open

      margin-bottom: 0.125rem;
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/assets/stylesheets/badges.scss by scss-lint

    0.7 should be written without a leading zero as .7
    Open

      padding: 0.7rem 1rem;
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/assets/stylesheets/buttons.scss by scss-lint

    0.8 should be written without a leading zero as .8
    Open

      box-shadow: 0 0.125rem 0.3125rem rgba(darken($grey, 10%), 0.8);
    Severity: Minor
    Found in app/assets/stylesheets/cards.scss by scss-lint
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