Method sources_autocomplete_tag
has a Cognitive Complexity of 18 (exceeds 5 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def sources_autocomplete_tag(source, term)
return nil if source.nil?
if term
s = regex_mark_tag(source.cached, term) + ' '
- Read upRead up
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.
A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:
- Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
- Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
- Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"
Further reading
Method has too many lines. [30/25] Open
def source_citation_totals(sources)
data = {}
max_total = 0
Citation.related_klasses.each do |k|
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks if the length of a method exceeds some maximum value. Comment lines can optionally be ignored. The maximum allowed length is configurable.
Method source_citation_totals
has a Cognitive Complexity of 12 (exceeds 5 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def source_citation_totals(sources)
data = {}
max_total = 0
Citation.related_klasses.each do |k|
- Read upRead up
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.
A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:
- Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
- Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
- Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"
Further reading
Method source_citation_totals
has 30 lines of code (exceeds 25 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def source_citation_totals(sources)
data = {}
max_total = 0
Citation.related_klasses.each do |k|
Method source_tag
has a Cognitive Complexity of 6 (exceeds 5 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def source_tag(source)
return nil if source.nil?
# TODO: sanitize should happen at the model validation level, not here!
source.cached ? sanitize(source.cached, tags: ['i']).html_safe : (source.new_record? ? nil : 'ERROR - Source cache not set, please notify admin.')
end
- Read upRead up
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.
A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:
- Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
- Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
- Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"
Further reading
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
source.cached ? sanitize(source.cached, tags: ['i']).html_safe : (source.new_record? ? nil : 'ERROR - Source cache not set, please notify admin.')
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
t.flatten.compact.join(' ').html_safe
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Use topics.present?
instead of !topics.blank?
. Open
t.push [':', topic_list_tag(topics).html_safe] if !topics.blank?
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for code that can be written with simpler conditionals
using Object#present?
defined by Active Support.
Interaction with Style/UnlessElse
:
The configuration of NotBlank
will not produce an offense in the
context of unless else
if Style/UnlessElse
is inabled. This is
to prevent interference between the auto-correction of the two cops.
Example: NotNilAndNotEmpty: true (default)
# Converts usages of `!nil? && !empty?` to `present?`
# bad
!foo.nil? && !foo.empty?
# bad
foo != nil && !foo.empty?
# good
foo.present?
Example: NotBlank: true (default)
# Converts usages of `!blank?` to `present?`
# bad
!foo.blank?
# bad
not foo.blank?
# good
foo.present?
Example: UnlessBlank: true (default)
# Converts usages of `unless blank?` to `if present?`
# bad
something unless foo.blank?
# good
something if foo.present?
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
s.html_safe
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
link_to(source_tag(source).html_safe, source.metamorphosize )
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
end.html_safe
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Use source.author_year.presence || not_provided
instead of source.author_year.present? ? source.author_year : not_provided
. Open
source.author_year.present? ? source.author_year : not_provided
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks code that can be written more easily using
Object#presence
defined by Active Support.
Example:
# bad
a.present? ? a : nil
# bad
!a.present? ? nil : a
# bad
a.blank? ? nil : a
# bad
!a.blank? ? a : nil
# good
a.presence
Example:
# bad
a.present? ? a : b
# bad
!a.present? ? b : a
# bad
a.blank? ? b : a
# bad
!a.blank? ? a : b
# good
a.presence || b
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
t.push [':', topic_list_tag(topics).html_safe] if !topics.blank?
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
source.documents.collect{|d| tag.a('View', class: 'circle-button', data: { pdfviewer: d.document_file(:original, false), sourceid: source.id}) if d.document_file_content_type == 'application/pdf'}.join.html_safe
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like html_safe
,
raw
, and safe_concat
. These methods do not escape content. They
simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead,
use safe_join
to join content and escape it and concat to
concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Use source.author_year.presence || not_provided
instead of source.author_year.present? ? source.author_year : not_provided
. Open
source.author_year.present? ? source.author_year : not_provided
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks code that can be written more easily using
Object#presence
defined by Active Support.
Example:
# bad
a.present? ? a : nil
# bad
!a.present? ? nil : a
# bad
a.blank? ? nil : a
# bad
!a.blank? ? a : nil
# good
a.presence
Example:
# bad
a.present? ? a : b
# bad
!a.present? ? b : a
# bad
a.blank? ? b : a
# bad
!a.blank? ? a : b
# good
a.presence || b
TODO found Open
# TODO: sanitize should happen at the model validation level, not here!
- Exclude checks
TODO found Open
# TODO: write helper methods
- Exclude checks
Identical blocks of code found in 2 locations. Consider refactoring. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
s += ' ' + tag.span('doc/pdf', class: [:feedback, 'feedback-success', 'feedback-thin']) if source.documentation.where(project_id: sessions_current_project_id).any?
- Read upRead up
Duplicated Code
Duplicated code can lead to software that is hard to understand and difficult to change. The Don't Repeat Yourself (DRY) principle states:
Every piece of knowledge must have a single, unambiguous, authoritative representation within a system.
When you violate DRY, bugs and maintenance problems are sure to follow. Duplicated code has a tendency to both continue to replicate and also to diverge (leaving bugs as two similar implementations differ in subtle ways).
Tuning
This issue has a mass of 28.
We set useful threshold defaults for the languages we support but you may want to adjust these settings based on your project guidelines.
The threshold configuration represents the minimum mass a code block must have to be analyzed for duplication. The lower the threshold, the more fine-grained the comparison.
If the engine is too easily reporting duplication, try raising the threshold. If you suspect that the engine isn't catching enough duplication, try lowering the threshold. The best setting tends to differ from language to language.
See codeclimate-duplication
's documentation for more information about tuning the mass threshold in your .codeclimate.yml
.
Refactorings
- Extract Method
- Extract Class
- Form Template Method
- Introduce Null Object
- Pull Up Method
- Pull Up Field
- Substitute Algorithm
Further Reading
- Don't Repeat Yourself on the C2 Wiki
- Duplicated Code on SourceMaking
- Refactoring: Improving the Design of Existing Code by Martin Fowler. Duplicated Code, p76
Identical blocks of code found in 2 locations. Consider refactoring. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
s += ' ' + tag.span('doc/pdf', class: [:feedback, 'feedback-success', 'feedback-thin']) if source.documentation.where(project_id: sessions_current_project_id).any?
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Duplicated Code
Duplicated code can lead to software that is hard to understand and difficult to change. The Don't Repeat Yourself (DRY) principle states:
Every piece of knowledge must have a single, unambiguous, authoritative representation within a system.
When you violate DRY, bugs and maintenance problems are sure to follow. Duplicated code has a tendency to both continue to replicate and also to diverge (leaving bugs as two similar implementations differ in subtle ways).
Tuning
This issue has a mass of 28.
We set useful threshold defaults for the languages we support but you may want to adjust these settings based on your project guidelines.
The threshold configuration represents the minimum mass a code block must have to be analyzed for duplication. The lower the threshold, the more fine-grained the comparison.
If the engine is too easily reporting duplication, try raising the threshold. If you suspect that the engine isn't catching enough duplication, try lowering the threshold. The best setting tends to differ from language to language.
See codeclimate-duplication
's documentation for more information about tuning the mass threshold in your .codeclimate.yml
.
Refactorings
- Extract Method
- Extract Class
- Form Template Method
- Introduce Null Object
- Pull Up Method
- Pull Up Field
- Substitute Algorithm
Further Reading
- Don't Repeat Yourself on the C2 Wiki
- Duplicated Code on SourceMaking
- Refactoring: Improving the Design of Existing Code by Martin Fowler. Duplicated Code, p76
Redundant use of Object#to_s
in interpolation. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
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- Exclude checks
This cop checks for string conversion in string interpolation, which is redundant.
Example:
# bad
"result is #{something.to_s}"
Example:
# good
"result is #{something}"
Redundant use of Object#to_s
in interpolation. Open
s += ' ' + ( c > 0 ? tag.span("#{c.to_s} #{'citations'.pluralize(c)}".html_safe, class: [:feedback, 'feedback-secondary', 'feedback-thin']) : '' )
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for string conversion in string interpolation, which is redundant.
Example:
# bad
"result is #{something.to_s}"
Example:
# good
"result is #{something}"