corthmann/eeny-meeny

require 'openssl'
require 'rack/utils'

module EenyMeeny
  # Encrypts messages with authentication
  #
  # The use of authentication is essential to avoid Chosen Ciphertext
  # Attacks.  By using this in an encrypt then MAC form, we avoid some
  # attacks such as e.g. being used as a CBC padding oracle to decrypt
  # the ciphertext.
  class Encryptor
    # Create the encryptor
    #
    # Pass in the secret, which should be at least 32-bytes worth of
    # entropy, e.g. a string generated by `SecureRandom.hex(32)`.
    # This also allows specification of the algorithm for the cipher
    # and MAC.  But don't change that unless you're very sure.
    def initialize(secret, cipher = 'aes-256-cbc', hmac = 'SHA256')
      @cipher = cipher
      @hmac   = hmac

      # use the HMAC to derive two independent keys for the encryption and
      # authentication of ciphertexts It is bad practice to use the same key
      # for encryption and authentication.  This also allows us to use all
      # of the entropy in a long key (e.g. 64 hex bytes) when straight
      # assignement would could result in assigning a key with a much
      # reduced key space.  Also, the personalisation strings further help
      # reduce the possibility of key reuse by ensuring it should be unique
      # to this gem, even with shared secrets.
      @encryption_key     = hmac("EncryptedCookie Encryption",     secret)
      @authentication_key = hmac("EncryptedCookie Authentication", secret)
    end

    # Encrypts message
    #
    # Returns the base64 encoded ciphertext plus IV.  In addtion, the
    # message is prepended with a MAC code to prevent chosen ciphertext
    # attacks.
    def encrypt(message)
      # encrypt the message
      encrypted = encrypt_message(message)

      [authenticate_message(encrypted) +   encrypted].pack('m0')
    end

    # decrypts base64 encoded ciphertext
    #
    # First, it checks the message tag and returns nil if that fails to verify.
    # Otherwise, the data is passed on to the AES function for decryption.
    def decrypt(ciphertext)
      ciphertext = ciphertext.unpack('m').first
      tag        = ciphertext[0, hmac_length]
      ciphertext = ciphertext[hmac_length..-1]

      # make sure we actually had enough data for the tag too.
      if tag && ciphertext && verify_message(tag, ciphertext)
        decrypt_ciphertext(ciphertext)
      else
        nil
      end
    end

    private

    # HMAC digest of the message using the given secret
    def hmac(secret, message)
      OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(@hmac, secret, message)
    end

    def hmac_length
      OpenSSL::Digest.new(@hmac).size
    end

    # returns the message authentication tag
    #
    # This is computed as HMAC(authentication_key, message)
    def authenticate_message(message)
      hmac(@authentication_key, message)
    end

    # verifies the message
    #
    # This does its best to be constant time, by use of the rack secure compare
    # function.
    def verify_message(tag, message)
      own_tag = authenticate_message(message)
      Rack::Utils.secure_compare(tag, own_tag)
    end

    # Encrypt
    #
    # Encrypts the given message with a random IV, then returns the ciphertext
    # with the IV prepended.
    def encrypt_message(message)
      aes = OpenSSL::Cipher.new(@cipher).encrypt
      aes.key = @encryption_key
      iv = aes.random_iv
      aes.iv = iv
      iv + (aes.update(message) << aes.final)
    end

    # Decrypt
    #
    # Pulls the IV off the front of the message and decrypts.  Catches
    # OpenSSL errors and returns nil.  But this should never happen, as the
    # verify method should catch all corrupted ciphertexts.
    def decrypt_ciphertext(ciphertext)
      aes = OpenSSL::Cipher.new(@cipher).decrypt
      aes.key = @encryption_key
      iv = ciphertext[0, aes.iv_len]
      aes.iv = iv
      crypted_text = ciphertext[aes.iv_len..-1]
      return nil if crypted_text.nil? || iv.nil?
      aes.update(crypted_text) << aes.final
    rescue
      nil
    end

  end
end