tag.span { msg } + tag.button(type: 'button', class: 'btn-close', 'data-bs-dismiss': 'alert', 'aria-label': 'Close')

Close

Checks the length of lines in the source code. The maximum length is configurable. The tab size is configured in the IndentationWidth of the Layout/IndentationStyle cop. It also ignores a shebang line by default.

This cop has some autocorrection capabilities. It can programmatically shorten certain long lines by inserting line breaks into expressions that can be safely split across lines. These include arrays, hashes, and method calls with argument lists.

If autocorrection is enabled, the following Layout cops are recommended to further format the broken lines. (Many of these are enabled by default.)

• ArgumentAlignment
• ArrayAlignment
• BlockAlignment
• BlockDelimiters
• BlockEndNewline
• ClosingParenthesisIndentation
• FirstArgumentIndentation
• FirstArrayElementIndentation
• FirstHashElementIndentation
• FirstParameterIndentation
• HashAlignment
• IndentationWidth
• MultilineArrayLineBreaks
• MultilineBlockLayout
• MultilineHashBraceLayout
• MultilineHashKeyLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodArgumentLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodParameterLineBreaks
• ParameterAlignment

Together, these cops will pretty print hashes, arrays, method calls, etc. For example, let's say the max columns is 25:

Example:

# bad
{foo: "0000000000", bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good
{foo: "0000000000",
bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good (with recommended cops enabled)
{
  foo: "0000000000",
  bar: "0000000000",
  baz: "0000000000",
}

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.long_text_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

    <%== pagy_bootstrap_nav(listing.pager) %>

Close

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is #3 on the 2013 [OWASP Top Ten](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A3-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS\)) web security risks and it pops up nearly everywhere.

XSS occurs when a user-controlled value is displayed on a web page without properly escaping it, allowing someone to inject Javascript or HTML into the page which will be interpreted and executed by the browser..

In Rails 2.x, values need to be explicitly escaped (e.g., by using the h method). Since Rails 3.x, auto-escaping in views is enabled by default. However, one can still use the raw or html_safe methods to output a value directly.

See the Ruby Security Guide for more details.

Query Parameters and Cookies

ERB example:

<%= params[:query].html_safe %>

Brakeman looks for several situations that can allow XSS. The simplest is like the example above: a value from the params or cookies is being directly output to a view. In such cases, it will issue a warning like:

Unescaped parameter value near line 3: params[:query]

By default, Brakeman will also warn when a parameter or cookie value is used as an argument to a method, the result of which is output unescaped to a view.

For example:

<%= raw some_method(cookie[:name]) %>

This raises a warning like:

Unescaped cookie value near line 5: some_method(cookies[:oreo])

However, the confidence level for this warning will be weak, because it is not directly outputting the cookie value.

Some methods are known to Brakeman to either be dangerous (link_to is one) or safe (escape_once). Users can specify safe methods using the --safe-methods option. Alternatively, Brakeman can be set to only warn when values are used directly with the --report-direct option.

Model Attributes

Because (many) models come from database values, Brakeman mistrusts them by default.

For example, if @user is an instance of a model set in an action like

def set_user
  @user = User.first
end

and there is a view with

<%= @user.name.html_safe %>

Brakeman will raise a warning like

Unescaped model attribute near line 3: User.first.name

If you trust all your data (although you probably shouldn't), this can be disabled with --ignore-model-output.

      scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.question_option_id") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

      scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.boolean_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.time_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.float_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

guard :rspec, cmd: "bundle exec rspec" do
  require "guard/rspec/dsl"
  dsl = Guard::RSpec::Dsl.new(self)

  # Feel free to open issues for suggestions and improvements

Close

Checks if the length of a block exceeds some maximum value. Comment lines can optionally be ignored. The maximum allowed length is configurable. The cop can be configured to ignore blocks passed to certain methods.

You can set constructs you want to fold with CountAsOne. Available are: 'array', 'hash', 'heredoc', and 'method_call'. Each construct will be counted as one line regardless of its actual size.

NOTE: The ExcludedMethods configuration is deprecated and only kept for backwards compatibility. Please use AllowedMethods and AllowedPatterns instead. By default, there are no methods to allowed.

Example: CountAsOne: ['array', 'heredoc', 'method_call']

something do
  array = [         # +1
    1,
    2
  ]

  hash = {          # +3
    key: 'value'
  }

  msg = <<~HEREDOC  # +1
    Heredoc
    content.
  HEREDOC

  foo(              # +1
    1,
    2
  )
end                 # 6 points

NOTE: This cop does not apply for Struct definitions.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.date_value") => direction, Arel.sql("#{join_name}.time_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.date_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

          <%== survey_qrcode(survey, format: :svg, module_size: 15) %>

Close

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is #3 on the 2013 [OWASP Top Ten](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A3-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS\)) web security risks and it pops up nearly everywhere.

XSS occurs when a user-controlled value is displayed on a web page without properly escaping it, allowing someone to inject Javascript or HTML into the page which will be interpreted and executed by the browser..

In Rails 2.x, values need to be explicitly escaped (e.g., by using the h method). Since Rails 3.x, auto-escaping in views is enabled by default. However, one can still use the raw or html_safe methods to output a value directly.

See the Ruby Security Guide for more details.

Query Parameters and Cookies

ERB example:

<%= params[:query].html_safe %>

Brakeman looks for several situations that can allow XSS. The simplest is like the example above: a value from the params or cookies is being directly output to a view. In such cases, it will issue a warning like:

Unescaped parameter value near line 3: params[:query]

By default, Brakeman will also warn when a parameter or cookie value is used as an argument to a method, the result of which is output unescaped to a view.

For example:

<%= raw some_method(cookie[:name]) %>

This raises a warning like:

Unescaped cookie value near line 5: some_method(cookies[:oreo])

However, the confidence level for this warning will be weak, because it is not directly outputting the cookie value.

Some methods are known to Brakeman to either be dangerous (link_to is one) or safe (escape_once). Users can specify safe methods using the --safe-methods option. Alternatively, Brakeman can be set to only warn when values are used directly with the --report-direct option.

Model Attributes

Because (many) models come from database values, Brakeman mistrusts them by default.

For example, if @user is an instance of a model set in an action like

def set_user
  @user = User.first
end

and there is a view with

<%= @user.name.html_safe %>

Brakeman will raise a warning like

Unescaped model attribute near line 3: User.first.name

If you trust all your data (although you probably shouldn't), this can be disabled with --ignore-model-output.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.integer_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

        scope.order(Arel.sql("#{join_name}.short_text_value") => direction)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

    def call(user:, visit:, tracker:, wants_preview:)
      fail! error: format(SUBMITTED_ERROR, survey.name.inspect) if already_submitted?(visit, wants_preview)
      fail! error: PERMISSION_ERROR unless user.can_create_reply?(survey)

      if user.can_preview_survey?(survey, wants_preview: wants_preview)

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

  def button_to(name = nil, options = nil, html_options = EMPTY_HASH, &block)
    htmx_attr_keys = options.is_a?(Hash) ? HTMX_ONLY_ATTRS & options.keys : EMPTY_ARRAY
    return orig_button_to(name, options, html_options, &block) if htmx_attr_keys.empty?

    html_options, options = options, name if block_given?

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

  def survey_open_indicator(survey)
    htmx = {
      'hx-post'    => survey.open? ? survey_close_path(survey) : survey_open_path(survey),
      'hx-vals'    => { authenticity_token: authenticity_token }.to_json,
      'hx-target'  => "#survey-card-#{survey.id}",

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

  def nav_link(content, path = nil, active:, **html_options)
    classes = %w[nav-link]

    unless path
      path    = content

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

  has_one :reply, class_name: 'Dragnet::Reply', foreign_key: :ahoy_visit_id, inverse_of: :ahoy_visit, dependent: :nullify

Close

Checks the length of lines in the source code. The maximum length is configurable. The tab size is configured in the IndentationWidth of the Layout/IndentationStyle cop. It also ignores a shebang line by default.

This cop has some autocorrection capabilities. It can programmatically shorten certain long lines by inserting line breaks into expressions that can be safely split across lines. These include arrays, hashes, and method calls with argument lists.

If autocorrection is enabled, the following Layout cops are recommended to further format the broken lines. (Many of these are enabled by default.)

• ArgumentAlignment
• ArrayAlignment
• BlockAlignment
• BlockDelimiters
• BlockEndNewline
• ClosingParenthesisIndentation
• FirstArgumentIndentation
• FirstArrayElementIndentation
• FirstHashElementIndentation
• FirstParameterIndentation
• HashAlignment
• IndentationWidth
• MultilineArrayLineBreaks
• MultilineBlockLayout
• MultilineHashBraceLayout
• MultilineHashKeyLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodArgumentLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodParameterLineBreaks
• ParameterAlignment

Together, these cops will pretty print hashes, arrays, method calls, etc. For example, let's say the max columns is 25:

Example:

# bad
{foo: "0000000000", bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good
{foo: "0000000000",
bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good (with recommended cops enabled)
{
  foo: "0000000000",
  bar: "0000000000",
  baz: "0000000000",
}

    has_many :copies, foreign_key: 'copy_of_id', class_name: 'Dragnet::Survey', dependent: :nullify, inverse_of: :copy_of

Close

Checks the length of lines in the source code. The maximum length is configurable. The tab size is configured in the IndentationWidth of the Layout/IndentationStyle cop. It also ignores a shebang line by default.

This cop has some autocorrection capabilities. It can programmatically shorten certain long lines by inserting line breaks into expressions that can be safely split across lines. These include arrays, hashes, and method calls with argument lists.

If autocorrection is enabled, the following Layout cops are recommended to further format the broken lines. (Many of these are enabled by default.)

• ArgumentAlignment
• ArrayAlignment
• BlockAlignment
• BlockDelimiters
• BlockEndNewline
• ClosingParenthesisIndentation
• FirstArgumentIndentation
• FirstArrayElementIndentation
• FirstHashElementIndentation
• FirstParameterIndentation
• HashAlignment
• IndentationWidth
• MultilineArrayLineBreaks
• MultilineBlockLayout
• MultilineHashBraceLayout
• MultilineHashKeyLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodArgumentLineBreaks
• MultilineMethodParameterLineBreaks
• ParameterAlignment

Together, these cops will pretty print hashes, arrays, method calls, etc. For example, let's say the max columns is 25:

Example:

# bad
{foo: "0000000000", bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good
{foo: "0000000000",
bar: "0000000000", baz: "0000000000"}

# good (with recommended cops enabled)
{
  foo: "0000000000",
  bar: "0000000000",
  baz: "0000000000",
}

    def data_grid_display(answers, question, alt: '-')
      return alt if answers.blank?

      tag.div(class: 'text-nowrap text-end') do
        answers.map do |answer|

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability