Mass assignment is not restricted using attr_accessible Open
class Criterion < ScoredQuestion
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This warning comes up if a model does not limit what attributes can be set through mass assignment.
In particular, this check looks for attr_accessible
inside model definitions. If it is not found, this warning will be issued.
Brakeman also warns on use of attr_protected
- especially since it was found to be vulnerable to bypass. Warnings for mass assignment on models using attr_protected
will be reported, but at a lower confidence level.
Note that disabling mass assignment globally will suppress these warnings.
Assignment Branch Condition size for complete is too high. [222.9/15] Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the ABC size of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The ABC size is based on assignments, branches (method calls), and conditions. See http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?AbcMetric
Assignment Branch Condition size for edit is too high. [90.14/15] Open
def edit(_count)
html = '<td align="center"><a rel="nofollow" data-method="delete" href="/questions/' + self.id.to_s + '">Remove</a></td>'
html += '<td><input size="6" value="' + self.seq.to_s + '" name="question[' + self.id.to_s + '][seq]"'
html += ' id="question_' + self.id.to_s + '_seq" type="text"></td>'
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the ABC size of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The ABC size is based on assignments, branches (method calls), and conditions. See http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?AbcMetric
Assignment Branch Condition size for view_completed_question is too high. [64.83/15] Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
html = '<b>' + count.to_s + ". " + self.txt + ' [Max points: ' + questionnaire_max.to_s + "]</b>"
score = answer && !answer.answer.nil? ? answer.answer.to_s : "-"
score_percent = if score != "-"
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the ABC size of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The ABC size is based on assignments, branches (method calls), and conditions. See http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?AbcMetric
Method complete
has a Cognitive Complexity of 46 (exceeds 5 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
- Read upRead up
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.
A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:
- Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
- Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
- Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"
Further reading
Assignment Branch Condition size for view_question_text is too high. [43.73/15] Open
def view_question_text
html = '<TD align="left"> ' + self.txt + ' </TD>'
html += '<TD align="left">' + self.type + '</TD>'
html += '<td align="center">' + self.weight.to_s + '</TD>'
questionnaire = self.questionnaire
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the ABC size of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The ABC size is based on assignments, branches (method calls), and conditions. See http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?AbcMetric
Perceived complexity for complete is too high. [30/7] Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop tries to produce a complexity score that's a measure of the
complexity the reader experiences when looking at a method. For that
reason it considers when
nodes as something that doesn't add as much
complexity as an if
or a &&
. Except if it's one of those special
case
/when
constructs where there's no expression after case
. Then
the cop treats it as an if
/elsif
/elsif
... and lets all the when
nodes count. In contrast to the CyclomaticComplexity cop, this cop
considers else
nodes as adding complexity.
Example:
def my_method # 1
if cond # 1
case var # 2 (0.8 + 4 * 0.2, rounded)
when 1 then func_one
when 2 then func_two
when 3 then func_three
when 4..10 then func_other
end
else # 1
do_something until a && b # 2
end # ===
end # 7 complexity points
Method complete
has 104 lines of code (exceeds 25 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
Cyclomatic complexity for complete is too high. [24/6] Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the cyclomatic complexity of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The cyclomatic complexity is the number of linearly independent paths through a method. The algorithm counts decision points and adds one.
An if statement (or unless or ?:) increases the complexity by one. An else branch does not, since it doesn't add a decision point. The && operator (or keyword and) can be converted to a nested if statement, and ||/or is shorthand for a sequence of ifs, so they also add one. Loops can be said to have an exit condition, so they add one.
Method view_completed_question
has a Cognitive Complexity of 22 (exceeds 5 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
html = '<b>' + count.to_s + ". " + self.txt + ' [Max points: ' + questionnaire_max.to_s + "]</b>"
score = answer && !answer.answer.nil? ? answer.answer.to_s : "-"
score_percent = if score != "-"
- Read upRead up
Cognitive Complexity
Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.
A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:
- Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
- Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
- Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"
Further reading
Perceived complexity for view_completed_question is too high. [16/7] Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
html = '<b>' + count.to_s + ". " + self.txt + ' [Max points: ' + questionnaire_max.to_s + "]</b>"
score = answer && !answer.answer.nil? ? answer.answer.to_s : "-"
score_percent = if score != "-"
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop tries to produce a complexity score that's a measure of the
complexity the reader experiences when looking at a method. For that
reason it considers when
nodes as something that doesn't add as much
complexity as an if
or a &&
. Except if it's one of those special
case
/when
constructs where there's no expression after case
. Then
the cop treats it as an if
/elsif
/elsif
... and lets all the when
nodes count. In contrast to the CyclomaticComplexity cop, this cop
considers else
nodes as adding complexity.
Example:
def my_method # 1
if cond # 1
case var # 2 (0.8 + 4 * 0.2, rounded)
when 1 then func_one
when 2 then func_two
when 3 then func_three
when 4..10 then func_other
end
else # 1
do_something until a && b # 2
end # ===
end # 7 complexity points
Cyclomatic complexity for view_completed_question is too high. [14/6] Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
html = '<b>' + count.to_s + ". " + self.txt + ' [Max points: ' + questionnaire_max.to_s + "]</b>"
score = answer && !answer.answer.nil? ? answer.answer.to_s : "-"
score_percent = if score != "-"
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks that the cyclomatic complexity of methods is not higher than the configured maximum. The cyclomatic complexity is the number of linearly independent paths through a method. The algorithm counts decision points and adds one.
An if statement (or unless or ?:) increases the complexity by one. An else branch does not, since it doesn't add a decision point. The && operator (or keyword and) can be converted to a nested if statement, and ||/or is shorthand for a sequence of ifs, so they also add one. Loops can be said to have an exit condition, so they add one.
Method has too many lines. [104/100] Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
if self.size.nil?
cols = '70'
rows = '1'
else
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks if the length of a method exceeds some maximum value. Comment lines can optionally be ignored. The maximum allowed length is configurable.
Method view_completed_question
has 47 lines of code (exceeds 25 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
html = '<b>' + count.to_s + ". " + self.txt + ' [Max points: ' + questionnaire_max.to_s + "]</b>"
score = answer && !answer.answer.nil? ? answer.answer.to_s : "-"
score_percent = if score != "-"
Method view_completed_question
has 5 arguments (exceeds 4 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def view_completed_question(count, answer, questionnaire_max, tag_prompt_deployments = nil, current_user = nil)
Method complete
has 5 arguments (exceeds 4 allowed). Consider refactoring. Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
Avoid more than 3 levels of block nesting. Open
if tag_dep.question_type == question.type and answer.comments.length > tag_dep.answer_length_threshold.to_i
html += tag_prompt.html_control(tag_dep, answer, current_user)
end
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for excessive nesting of conditional and looping constructs.
You can configure if blocks are considered using the CountBlocks
option. When set to false
(the default) blocks are not counted
towards the nesting level. Set to true
to count blocks as well.
The maximum level of nesting allowed is configurable.
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<TR>".html_safe, "</TR>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<tr>".html_safe, "</tr>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<tr>".html_safe, "</tr>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<tr>".html_safe, "</tr>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<TR>".html_safe, "</TR>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["<TR>".html_safe, "</TR>".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
html += '<br>' + answer.comments.html_safe
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Tagging a string as html safe may be a security risk. Open
safe_join(["".html_safe, "".html_safe], html.html_safe)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for the use of output safety calls like htmlsafe, raw, and safeconcat. These methods do not escape content. They simply return a SafeBuffer containing the content as is. Instead, use safe_join to join content and escape it and concat to concatenate content and escape it, ensuring its safety.
Example:
user_content = "hi"
# bad
"#{user_content}
".html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
"
# good
content_tag(:p, user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "<b>hi</b>
"
# bad
out = ""
out << "#{user_content} "
out << "#{user_content} "
out.html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi
hi "
# good
out = []
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
out << content_tag(:li, user_content)
safe_join(out)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b>
<b>hi</b> "
# bad
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.safe_concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "trusted_content
hi"
# good
out = "trusted content
".html_safe
out.concat(user_content)
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "trusted_content
<b>hi</b>"
# safe, though maybe not good style
out = "trusted content"
result = out.concat(user_content)
# => String "trusted contenthi"
# because when rendered in ERB the String will be escaped:
# <%= result %>
# => trusted content<b>hi</b>
# bad
(user_content + " " + content_tag(:span, user_content)).html_safe
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer "hi <span><b>hi</b></span>"
# good
safe_join([user_content, " ", content_tag(:span, user_content)])
# => ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer
# "<b>hi</b> <span><b>hi</b></span>"
Identical blocks of code found in 2 locations. Consider refactoring. Open
html += '<td width="10%"><input type="radio" id="' + j.to_s + '" value="' + j.to_s + '" name="Radio_' + self.id.to_s + '"'
html += 'checked="checked"' if (!answer.nil? and answer.answer == j) or (answer.nil? and questionnaire_min == j)
html += '></td>'
end
- Read upRead up
Duplicated Code
Duplicated code can lead to software that is hard to understand and difficult to change. The Don't Repeat Yourself (DRY) principle states:
Every piece of knowledge must have a single, unambiguous, authoritative representation within a system.
When you violate DRY, bugs and maintenance problems are sure to follow. Duplicated code has a tendency to both continue to replicate and also to diverge (leaving bugs as two similar implementations differ in subtle ways).
Tuning
This issue has a mass of 45.
We set useful threshold defaults for the languages we support but you may want to adjust these settings based on your project guidelines.
The threshold configuration represents the minimum mass a code block must have to be analyzed for duplication. The lower the threshold, the more fine-grained the comparison.
If the engine is too easily reporting duplication, try raising the threshold. If you suspect that the engine isn't catching enough duplication, try lowering the threshold. The best setting tends to differ from language to language.
See codeclimate-duplication
's documentation for more information about tuning the mass threshold in your .codeclimate.yml
.
Refactorings
- Extract Method
- Extract Class
- Form Template Method
- Introduce Null Object
- Pull Up Method
- Pull Up Field
- Substitute Algorithm
Further Reading
- Don't Repeat Yourself on the C2 Wiki
- Duplicated Code on SourceMaking
- Refactoring: Improving the Design of Existing Code by Martin Fowler. Duplicated Code, p76
Useless assignment to variable - resp
. Open
resp = Response.find(answer.response_id)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for every useless assignment to local variable in every
scope.
The basic idea for this cop was from the warning of ruby -cw
:
assigned but unused variable - foo
Currently this cop has advanced logic that detects unreferenced reassignments and properly handles varied cases such as branch, loop, rescue, ensure, etc.
Example:
# bad
def some_method
some_var = 1
do_something
end
Example:
# good
def some_method
some_var = 1
do_something(some_var)
end
Favor unless
over if
for negative conditions. Open
current_value += 'data-current-rating =' + answer.answer.to_s if !answer.nil?
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
Checks for uses of if with a negated condition. Only ifs without else are considered. There are three different styles:
- both
- prefix
- postfix
Example: EnforcedStyle: both (default)
# enforces `unless` for `prefix` and `postfix` conditionals
# bad
if !foo
bar
end
# good
unless foo
bar
end
# bad
bar if !foo
# good
bar unless foo
Example: EnforcedStyle: prefix
# enforces `unless` for just `prefix` conditionals
# bad
if !foo
bar
end
# good
unless foo
bar
end
# good
bar if !foo
Example: EnforcedStyle: postfix
# enforces `unless` for just `postfix` conditionals
# bad
bar if !foo
# good
bar unless foo
# good
if !foo
bar
end
Optional arguments should appear at the end of the argument list. Open
def complete(count, answer = nil, questionnaire_min, questionnaire_max, dropdown_or_scale)
- Read upRead up
- Exclude checks
This cop checks for optional arguments to methods that do not come at the end of the argument list
Example:
# bad
def foo(a = 1, b, c)
end
# good
def baz(a, b, c = 1)
end
def foobar(a = 1, b = 2, c = 3)
end