def write_to_epp_log
      request_command = params[:command] || params[:action] # error receives :command, other methods receive :action
      frame = params[:raw_frame] || params[:frame]

      # filter pw

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

  def registrant_update_confirmable?(token)
    return false if statuses.include? DomainStatus::DELETE_CANDIDATE
    return false unless pending_update?
    return false unless registrant_verification_asked?
    return false unless registrant_verification_token == token

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

    def req_poll
      @notification = current_user.unread_notifications.order('created_at DESC').take

      render_epp_response 'epp/poll/poll_no_messages' and return unless @notification

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability

      where(condition, now: Time.zone.now)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

          xml = File.read("#{xml_dir_path}/#{obj}/#{epp_action}.xml")

Close

Using user input when accessing files (local or remote) will raise a warning in Brakeman.

For example

File.open("/tmp/#{cookie[:file]}")

will raise an error like

Cookie value used in file name near line 4: File.open("/tmp/#{cookie[:file]}")

This type of vulnerability can be used to access arbitrary files on a server (including /etc/passwd.

          "select generate_zonefile('#{params[:origin]}')"

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

        "select generate_zonefile('#{origin}')"

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

      params[:q][:created_at_gteq] = Date.send(default_date).strftime('%Y-%m-%d')

Close

Using unfiltered user data to select a Class or Method to be dynamically sent is dangerous.

It is much safer to whitelist the desired target or method.

Unsafe use of method:

method = params[:method]
@result = User.send(method.to_sym)

Safe:

method = params[:method] == 1 ? :method_a : :method_b
@result = User.send(method, *args)

Unsafe use of target:

table = params[:table]
model = table.classify.constantize
@result = model.send(:method)

Safe:

target = params[:target] == 1 ? Account : User
@result = target.send(:method, *args)

Including user data in the arguments passed to an Object#send is safe, as long as the method can properly handle potentially bad data.

Safe:

args = params["args"] || []
@result = User.send(:method, *args)

      where("#{attribute_alias(:effect_time)} > ?", Time.zone.now)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

      params[:q][:created_at_gteq] = Date.send(default_date).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")

Close

Using unfiltered user data to select a Class or Method to be dynamically sent is dangerous.

It is much safer to whitelist the desired target or method.

Unsafe use of method:

method = params[:method]
@result = User.send(method.to_sym)

Safe:

method = params[:method] == 1 ? :method_a : :method_b
@result = User.send(method, *args)

Unsafe use of target:

table = params[:table]
model = table.classify.constantize
@result = model.send(:method)

Safe:

target = params[:target] == 1 ? Account : User
@result = target.send(:method, *args)

Including user data in the arguments passed to an Object#send is safe, as long as the method can properly handle potentially bad data.

Safe:

args = params["args"] || []
@result = User.send(:method, *args)

      send(validation_method)

Close

Using unfiltered user data to select a Class or Method to be dynamically sent is dangerous.

It is much safer to whitelist the desired target or method.

Unsafe use of method:

method = params[:method]
@result = User.send(method.to_sym)

Safe:

method = params[:method] == 1 ? :method_a : :method_b
@result = User.send(method, *args)

Unsafe use of target:

table = params[:table]
model = table.classify.constantize
@result = model.send(:method)

Safe:

target = params[:target] == 1 ? Account : User
@result = target.send(:method, *args)

Including user data in the arguments passed to an Object#send is safe, as long as the method can properly handle potentially bad data.

Safe:

args = params["args"] || []
@result = User.send(:method, *args)

      versions = Version::DomainVersion.includes(:item).where(where_s).order(created_at: :desc, id: :desc)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

      table = CSV.parse(File.read(filename), headers: true)

Close

Using user input when accessing files (local or remote) will raise a warning in Brakeman.

For example

File.open("/tmp/#{cookie[:file]}")

will raise an error like

Cookie value used in file name near line 4: File.open("/tmp/#{cookie[:file]}")

This type of vulnerability can be used to access arbitrary files on a server (including /etc/passwd.

              %dd= @crt.extensions.map(&:to_s).join('<br>').html_safe

Close

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is #3 on the 2013 [OWASP Top Ten](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A3-Cross-Site_Scripting_(XSS\)) web security risks and it pops up nearly everywhere.

XSS occurs when a user-controlled value is displayed on a web page without properly escaping it, allowing someone to inject Javascript or HTML into the page which will be interpreted and executed by the browser..

In Rails 2.x, values need to be explicitly escaped (e.g., by using the h method). Since Rails 3.x, auto-escaping in views is enabled by default. However, one can still use the raw or html_safe methods to output a value directly.

See the Ruby Security Guide for more details.

Query Parameters and Cookies

ERB example:

<%= params[:query].html_safe %>

Brakeman looks for several situations that can allow XSS. The simplest is like the example above: a value from the params or cookies is being directly output to a view. In such cases, it will issue a warning like:

Unescaped parameter value near line 3: params[:query]

By default, Brakeman will also warn when a parameter or cookie value is used as an argument to a method, the result of which is output unescaped to a view.

For example:

<%= raw some_method(cookie[:name]) %>

This raises a warning like:

Unescaped cookie value near line 5: some_method(cookies[:oreo])

However, the confidence level for this warning will be weak, because it is not directly outputting the cookie value.

Some methods are known to Brakeman to either be dangerous (link_to is one) or safe (escape_once). Users can specify safe methods using the --safe-methods option. Alternatively, Brakeman can be set to only warn when values are used directly with the --report-direct option.

Model Attributes

Because (many) models come from database values, Brakeman mistrusts them by default.

For example, if @user is an instance of a model set in an action like

def set_user
  @user = User.first
end

and there is a view with

<%= @user.name.html_safe %>

Brakeman will raise a warning like

Unescaped model attribute near line 3: User.first.name

If you trust all your data (although you probably shouldn't), this can be disabled with --ignore-model-output.

        params[:q][:created_at_gteq] = Date.send(default_date).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")

Close

Using unfiltered user data to select a Class or Method to be dynamically sent is dangerous.

It is much safer to whitelist the desired target or method.

Unsafe use of method:

method = params[:method]
@result = User.send(method.to_sym)

Safe:

method = params[:method] == 1 ? :method_a : :method_b
@result = User.send(method, *args)

Unsafe use of target:

table = params[:table]
model = table.classify.constantize
@result = model.send(:method)

Safe:

target = params[:target] == 1 ? Account : User
@result = target.send(:method, *args)

Including user data in the arguments passed to an Object#send is safe, as long as the method can properly handle potentially bad data.

Safe:

args = params["args"] || []
@result = User.send(:method, *args)

    where("#{attribute_alias(:outzone_time)} < ?", Time.zone.now)

Close

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

    def validate_domain_integrity
      return unless Domain.release_to_auction

      dn = DNS::DomainName.new(domain.name)
      if dn.at_auction? || dn.is_deadline_is_reached?

Close

Cognitive Complexity

Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how difficult a unit of code is to intuitively understand. Unlike Cyclomatic Complexity, which determines how difficult your code will be to test, Cognitive Complexity tells you how difficult your code will be to read and comprehend.

A method's cognitive complexity is based on a few simple rules:

• Code is not considered more complex when it uses shorthand that the language provides for collapsing multiple statements into one
• Code is considered more complex for each "break in the linear flow of the code"
• Code is considered more complex when "flow breaking structures are nested"

Further reading

• Cognitive Complexity docs
• Cognitive Complexity: A new way of measuring understandability