publiclab/plots2

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Calls to validates_format_of ..., :with => // which do not use \A and \z as anchors will cause this warning. Using ^ and $ is not sufficient, as they will only match up to a new line. This allows an attacker to put whatever malicious input they would like before or after a new line character.

See the Ruby Security Guide for details.

Injection is #1 on the 2013 OWASP Top Ten web security risks. SQL injection is when a user is able to manipulate a value which is used unsafely inside a SQL query. This can lead to data leaks, data loss, elevation of privilege, and other unpleasant outcomes.

Brakeman focuses on ActiveRecord methods dealing with building SQL statements.

A basic (Rails 2.x) example looks like this:

User.first(:conditions => "username = '#{params[:username]}'")

Brakeman would produce a warning like this:

Possible SQL injection near line 30: User.first(:conditions => ("username = '#{params[:username]}'"))

The safe way to do this query is to use a parameterized query:

User.first(:conditions => ["username = ?", params[:username]])

Brakeman also understands the new Rails 3.x way of doing things (and local variables and concatenation):

username = params[:user][:name].downcase
password = params[:user][:password]

User.first.where("username = '" + username + "' AND password = '" + password + "'")

This results in this kind of warning:

Possible SQL injection near line 37:
User.first.where((((("username = '" + params[:user][:name].downcase) + "' AND password = '") + params[:user][:password]) + "'"))

See the Ruby Security Guide for more information and Rails-SQLi.org for many examples of SQL injection in Rails.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Calls to validates_format_of ..., :with => // which do not use \A and \z as anchors will cause this warning. Using ^ and $ is not sufficient, as they will only match up to a new line. This allows an attacker to put whatever malicious input they would like before or after a new line character.

See the Ruby Security Guide for details.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.

Unvalidated redirects and forwards are #10 on the OWASP Top Ten.

Redirects which rely on user-supplied values can be used to "spoof" websites or hide malicious links in otherwise harmless-looking URLs. They can also allow access to restricted areas of a site if the destination is not validated.

Brakeman will raise warnings whenever redirect_to appears to be used with a user-supplied value that may allow them to change the :host option.

For example,

redirect_to params.merge(:action => :home)

will create a warning like

Possible unprotected redirect near line 46: redirect_to(params)

This is because params could contain :host => 'evilsite.com' which would redirect away from your site and to a malicious site.

If the first argument to redirect_to is a hash, then adding :only_path => true will limit the redirect to the current host. Another option is to specify the host explicitly.

redirect_to params.merge(:only_path => true)

redirect_to params.merge(:host => 'myhost.com')

If the first argument is a string, then it is possible to parse the string and extract the path:

redirect_to URI.parse(some_url).path

If the URL does not contain a protocol (e.g., http://), then you will probably get unexpected results, as redirect_to will prepend the current host name and a protocol.